Fertility, social norms, and the challenges of childbearing in East Asia

In East Asia, high marriage rates coexist with some of the world’s lowest fertility rates. So, why are so few children born in these societies?  And  how is this related to the strongly embedded cultural and Confucianist influences?

Professors Sunha Myong, Jungjae Park, and Junjian Yi investigate the cultural and socioeconomic factors shaping these trends. Using a mathematical model, the team explore how deeply rooted social norms – like unequal childcare and stigma against out-of-wedlock births – impact fertility decisions. Importantly, they examine how shifts in gender roles and government policies could hold the key to reversing declining birth rates.

Read the original research: doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvaa048

Transcript:

Hello and welcome to Research Pod! Thank you for listening and joining us today.

In this episode, we look at the intersections of social norms with choices around fertility, and examine a model of how government policies can influence childbearing. East Asian societies have some of the lowest fertility rates in the world, despite high marriage rates. We’ll explore why this happens, the impact of Confucianism, and how government policies might help.

East Asian countries like Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Macau, and Singapore share some common features around marriage and childbearing choices. These societies, despite their political differences, are culturally linked, especially through Confucianist thought, and exhibit similar patterns of fertility. China’s politics and population control is markedly different from other East Asian countries, and influenced by their former one child family laws. However, nowadays, contemporary marriage and fertility patterns in China are consistent with other countries in the region.

One of the most intriguing aspects is the combination of high marriage rates and low fertility rates. Nearly all married women have at least one child, although often only one, while virtually no single women have children. This stark contrast between the fertility decisions of married and single women is rooted in deeply seated cultural factors. Professors Myong from Singapore Management University, together with Professor Park from Yonsei University, and Yi from Peking University, have been creating a mathematical model to represent the social norms and pressures that have led to this situation, and explore how social and religious pressures have led to this situation. For many years, insufficient children have been born to replace the population in East Asian countries and their fertility rates are the very lowest in the world.

Two key social norms play a significant role in shaping these patterns: the unequal division of childcare and the stigma against out-of-wedlock births. The unequal gender division of childcare significantly contributes to low fertility rates, particularly among highly educated women. In these societies, women are primarily responsible for childcare, regardless of their wages. Historically, this didn’t significantly impact fertility rates, because women’s pay tended to be significantly lower, especially in relation to her husband’s salary. However, as women’s education and wages have increased,  there has been a sharp increase in the opportunity cost. The optimal labour division has often also changed as a result of the rise in women’s relative wage, reconciling the higher opportunity cost and disproportionate burden of childcare has the logical consequence of women choosing to have less children. Therefore, the higher cost for raising children contributes to low fertility rates.

The stigma against out-of-wedlock births also affects fertility decisions but to a lesser extent. Virtually no single women have children in East Asian societies, a pattern that starkly contrasts with other regions where single motherhood is more common.

To understand these patterns better, it’s helpful to differentiate between two aspects of fertility: the extensive margin (likelihood of having any children) and the intensive margin (number of children among those who have them). In East Asia, the extensive margin has remained largely unchanged—most married women still have a child. However, the intensive margin has shifted significantly, with fewer children being born to those who do have them. This shift is particularly pronounced among highly educated women, for whom the opportunity cost of having children is highest due to their higher wages and persistent unequal gender roles in childcare.

Confucian culture emphasizes a wife’s obedience to her husband. Thus, gender roles persistently regulate the division of housework, of which childcare is a major component. Data from the Korean Time Use Survey shows that the gender division of housework does not vary significantly across education levels, indicating persistent gender ideology. Confucianism also emphasises the importance of continuing the family line as a social responsibility and a deeply ingrained notion that has persisted for thousands of years in East Asian societies.

Marriage is regarded as a prerequisite for childbearing, and the purpose of the family is to produce offspring to continue the family line. This cultural backdrop, combined with increased women’s education and labour force participation, has created tensions for single and childless people. The opportunity cost of raising children has risen, especially for highly educated women, leading to lower fertility rates.

To quantify the model of the marriage and fertility rates, data was drawn from South Korean censuses and household surveys. A structural model was created using statistics to test hypotheses and evaluate the important of social norms in marriage and fertility decisions. In this model, marriage is regarded as attractive for both men and women as they derive high utility from having children inside marriage, but men benefit more than women as marriage is the only way for men to have children, and the model also accounts for the differing marginal utility of having children for single and married households, as well as the social stigma driven childlessness of single women.

The main dataset includes a 20 percent sample of the 2015 South Korean population and housing census, focusing on women aged 45–70 who have completed their fertility. Educational attainment varies from no schooling to doctoral degrees. The childlessness rate among married women shows a U-shaped pattern across education levels, indicating poverty-driven childlessness for low-educated women. The model reproduces the relationship between marriage rates and education, showing a hump-shaped correlation for women and a positive correlation for men.

The tension between persistent gender ideology and rapid socioeconomic development drives unique marriage and fertility patterns in East Asian societies. Confucian norms prioritize family continuity, low intra-household bargaining power for women, and unequal childcare division. With increased women’s education and a decreasing gender wage gap, optimal marriage and fertility decisions increasingly deviate from Confucian norms.

In creating their model, Professor Myong and her team, consider norms such as unequal gender division of childcare and stigma attached to birth outside of wedlock. They then conducted two policy experiments using the mathematical model. Professor Myong’s team used their model to draw 100,000 women from each education category,  paired with a potential husband randomly selected from the empirical distribution of men’s education levels.

This modelling suggests that in South Korea, the total fertility rate could increase from 2.03 to 2.26 if the norm of unequal childcare division were removed. This would put the fertility rate above the population replacement level of 2.10. The removal of this norm would result in higher marriage rates, lower childlessness rates among married women, and increased completed fertility of mothers, with the most significant effects observed among highly educated women.

To encourage highly educated women to have more babies, therefore, a social revolution is needed. This involves advocating for equal gender roles within households, a challenging task given the deep-rooted Confucian values. Persistent social pressure to challenge and change gender norms, alongside the administrative efforts of the childcare subsidy and other policies, would support and supplement the success of fertility-boosting initiatives.

Interestingly, the patterns observed in South Korea also hold true for other East Asian societies. When the social norm of unequal childcare was removed in models total fertility increased, marriage rates rose, childlessness rates among married women dropped, and completed fertility for mothers increased. These findings underscore the significant impact of social norms and the potential benefits of policy interventions aimed at promoting gender equality.

However, the model does have limitations. It randomly matches individuals with potential marriage partners, although the quantitative analysis remains robust when this assumption is relaxed. The model assumes that married couples agree on fertility decisions, and the model also simplifies labour supply decisions.

The tension between persistent gender ideology rooted in Confucianism and rapid socioeconomic development drives choices around marriage and childbearing in East Asia. Fertility patterns in East Asian societies are driven by a complex interplay of traditions and modern socioeconomic pressures. To address the challenges of low fertility rates, particularly among highly educated women, comprehensive policy measures promoting equal gender roles within households are required. While challenging, such a shift could lead to higher fertility rates and a more sustainable population growth.

That’s all for this episode – thanks for listening, and stay subscribed to Research Pod for more of the latest science.

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